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WHEN BIG DATA MEETS BIG BROTHER:
WHY COURTS SHOULD APPLY UNITED STATES V. JONES
TO PROTECT PEOPLE'S DATA
Brad Turner*
In an age when people's lives are constantly tracked, recorded,
analyzed, and shared by private parties, the Third-Party Doctrine,
which holds that "information knowingly exposed to private
parties is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment, " now threatens
to swallow whole the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. This Article suggests courts adopt the Klayman v.
Obama approach and hold that the Fourth Amendment's
protections apply to government acquisitions of Big Data. More
specifically, courts should follow Justice Samuel Alito's reasoning
in United States v. Jones to hold that government acquisitions of
Big Data are searches subject to the reasonableness requirements
of the Fourth Amendment. Surely, if the government's collection of
a person's GPS data in Jones was intrusive enough to constitute a
search, then so too should government acquisitions of Big Data.
Though such a holding would leave unresolved many important
questions, it would be a significant first step that would bring the
Fourth Amendment into the twenty-first century and enable the
next generation ofAmericans to conduct their lives without fear of
unreasonable government searches and seizures of their data.
Brad Turner is a graduate of Duke Law School and a practicing attorney in
Ohio. I would like to thank the terrific staff of the North Carolina Journal of
Law and Technology for their significant contributions to this Article. I would
also like to thank my wonderful partner, Kristi Horvath, for her love, support,
and frequent reminders that formal writing does not mean "sterile" writing.
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When Big Data Meets Big Brother
I. INTRODUCTION
"Big Brother is Watching You.
Big Data2 is fast becoming big business.' In an effort to target
consumers with advertisements that connect consumers with goods
and services that they are likely to buy, businesses track, collect,
store, analyze, and share consumer data.4 From smartphones' to
smart thermostats, 6 from customer loyalty cards' to in-store motion
detectors,' from cookies9 to web beaconso and beyond,"
' GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 2 (Signet Classic 1977).
2I use the term "Big Data" throughout this Article to refer to the entire
ecosystem of data trackers, collectors, analyzers, sharers, and sellers of people's
data. I define data to include any information in electronic form.
See McKinsey & Company, Big Data, Analytics and the Future of Marketing
and Sales, FORBES (July 22, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mckinsey/
2013/07/22/big-data-analytics-and-the-future-of-marketing-sales/ (discussing how
Big Data is becoming big business).
4 See Lisa Arthur, What Is Big Data?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:17 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaarthur/2013/08/15/what-is-big-data/ (discussing
how unstructured and structured data collectively makes up "Big Data").
5 How Big Data Is Transforming The Mobile Industry, BUSINESS INSIDER
(June 20, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/big-data-will-transform-
mobile-industry-2013-6 (showing how smartphones are part of Big Data
collection).
6 Parmy Olson, Nest Gives Google Its Next Big Data Play: Energy, FORBES
(Jan. 13, 2014, 6:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/01/13/
nest-gives-google-its-next-big-data-play-energy/ (discussing Google's "next Big
Data play:" Nest-a smart thermostat company).
Tom Groenfeldt, Sears Competes on Big Data and Loyalty Programs,
FORBES (May 2, 2012, 10:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/
201 2 /05/02/sears-competes-on-big-data-and-loyalty-programs/ (explaining Sears's
Loyalty Card Big Data program).
8 Paul Richards, Consumer Behavior Aggressively Tracked This Season,
CNBC (Nov. 29, 2013, 7:34 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101235143 (detailing
new technologies businesses have deployed to track consumer behavior).
9 See infra Part II.A.
10 Consumers, Big Data, and Online Tracking in the Retail Industry: A Case
Study of Walmart, THE CENTER FOR MEDIA JUSTICE 22 (Nov. 2013),
http://centerformediajustice.org/wp-content/files/WALMARTPRIVACY_.pdf
(explaining that Walmart uses web beacons to track its users' activities).
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companies obtain people's data from every source possible in an
attempt to transform that data into consumer sales.'2
Of course, Big Data is valuable to more than just the private
sector. Governments of all shapes and sizes are quickly learning
the potential value of obtaining and using Big Data." Unlike
business, however, government cannot obtain huge troves of data
about its citizens without raising the specter of Orwell's Big
Brother.14 Recent revelations about the size and scope of the
National Security Agency's ("NSA") data-collection efforts, for
example, have sparked a national debate about the propriety of the
government collecting huge quantities of highly-detailed data
about its citizens." In a post-9/11 age when people conduct much
of their daily lives online, Americans are understandably
concerned about whether our national security apparatus strikes the
proper balance between national security and civil liberties. 6
Thankfully, unlike the citizens in Orwell's 1984," Americans
have a tough, old friend to protect them from Big Brother: the
" See Arthur, supra note 4 (introducing Big Data and the ways it can be
collected).
12 McKinsey & Company, supra note 3 (discussing how Big Data is becoming
big business).
1 See Gil Press, A New Big Data Roadmap for Government (and Business),
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2012/10/03/
a-new-big-data-roadmap-for-government-and-business/ (discussing several reports
that show governments large and small are learning to embrace Big Data).
14 See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Big Data, Meet Big Brother, TIME (July 8, 2013)
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2146453,00.html (raising the
specter of big brother). As an aside, I chose the title of this Article long before
finding this similarly-titled article. I take the serendipitous coincidence as
reassurance that I am not alone in my concerns and that this Article raises
legitimate concerns worthy of public debate.
'5 See Eileen Sullivan & Lara Jakes, NSA Surveillance Debate Muddied by Numbers
Game, HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/06/20/nsa-surveillance-debate n_3475028.html (discussing public debate
over the NSA program).
16 See id. (showing how the debate is about proper balance of national security
and civil liberties).
" GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic 1977).
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Fourth Amendment.'" The Fourth Amendment's protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures have protected
Americans' persons, papers, and effects for generations. And in an
age when people's lives are constantly being tracked, recorded,
analyzed, and shared by third parties,' 9 its protections have never
been more important.
The problem, exposed by the NSA's continued snooping, is a
bit of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence called the "Third-Party
Doctrine."20 Long ago, the Supreme Court said that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information that person
knowingly exposes to others.2' While such a policy may have made
sense at a time when ubiquitous government surveillance was a
practical and political impossibility, it makes little sense today.
Nearly everything people do today becomes data. And nearly every
bit of data is shared, knowingly or unknowingly, voluntarily or
involuntarily, with others. The script has flipped: it is as difficult
today for a person to avoid being tracked as it was thirty or forty
years ago for the government to track that same person. Thus, a
once small and manageable exception to the Fourth Amendment,
the Third-Party Doctrine, now threatens to swallow whole the
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
As the institution that created the Third-Party Doctrine so
many years ago,22 courts have the duty to ensure that it does not
completely destroy privacy in the information age-an era where
constant and pervasive surveillance is the norm. This Article
suggests that courts adopt the Klayman v. Obama23 approach and
hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to government
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19 See Daniel Zwerdling & G.W. Schulz, Your Digital Trail, And How It Can
Be Used Against You, NPR (Sept. 30, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/
blogs/alltechconsidered/201 3/09 /3 0/ 2 2 6 8 3 5934/your-digital-trail-and-how-it-can-
be-used-against-you (discussing how people are leaving a "digital trail"
everywhere they go and with everything they do).
20 See infra Part IV.C (explaining third party rule).
21 See infra Part IV.C.
22 See infra Part IV.C.
23 957 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013).
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acquisitions of Big Data, including metadata. More specifically,
courts should follow Justice Alito's reasoning in United States v.
Jones24 to hold that government acquisitions of Big Data are
searches subject to the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Surely, if the government's collection of someone's
global positioning system ("GPS") data in Jones was intrusive
enough to constitute a search, then so are government acquisitions
of Big Data.
Though such a holding would leave unresolved many
challenging questions, such as whether the collection of bulk data
would require a warrant, it would be an important first step that
would bring the Fourth Amendment into the twenty-first century
and enable the next generation of Americans to conduct their lives
without fear of unreasonable government searches and seizures of
their data.
II. BIG DATA AND THE ILLUSION OF PRIVACY
Despite whatever Americans may believe or desire about
privacy, their activities are far. from private. Every website visit,
every hyperlink click, every Facebook message sent, and every
YouTube video watched is being tracked.25 Even offline activities,
like shopping, driving, walking, and exercising are being tracked.2 6
In the words of the Jurassic Park ranger tracked by a pack of
velociraptors,2 7 "We are being hunted."28 Instead of velociraptors
hunting Americans for lunch, Americans are being hunted for the
purpose of advertising, or more generally, for the purpose of
making money from their data. Only, unlike the trained Jurassic
Park ranger, many Americans do not know they are being hunted.
2 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
25 See infra Part II.A.
26 See infra Part II.B.
27 These small but fast carnivorous dinosaurs make for a surprisingly good
metaphor. Translated literally, the term velociraptor means "swift seizer."
Velociraptor, RED ORBIT, http://www.redorbit.com/education/referencelibrary/
animal kingdom/dinosauria/1112832683/velociraptor/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2014).
28 JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993).
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One scholar compared this to a two-way mirror: the end-user sees
her own activities reflected in the two-way mirror, and does not
realize that on the other side, she is actually being observed by any
number of faceless, non-descript organizations that she probably
does not even know exist.29
A. Tracking Online Activities
Nearly everything a person does online is tracked in some way.
Advertisers are looking for valuable ad space, and companies with
that space are eager to cash-in.
1. The Fundamentals of Online Tracking: Cookies, Website
Activity Logs, Form Data, and Web Beacons
When a person visits a website, the website will place a
"cookie" on the person's computer or electronic device that tracks
the person's activities on the website.30 These cookies can be set to
erase themselves after the individual leaves the website-or not.'
Persistent (multi-session) cookies stay on a person's computer and
can stay there until they expire, which can be months or even
years.3 Persistent cookies are the objects of code on a person's
computer that enable a website to "remember" a visitor so that a
visitor need not, for example, re-enter her username and password
each time she wishes to log on to her email.33 Typically, cookies
29 See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to Reveal: The Growing Threat
to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 4 (2011) (introducing the concept of the "two-way mirror" for the
Internet data context). Users who have downloaded and installed "Do Not
Track" software, like "Do Not Track Me," will see that for every website they
visit, numerous vaguely-named shadowy-sounding organizations like "Qualaroo"
and "Typekit" and "Comscore Beacon" are tracking their activities. See, e.g.,
ABINE, https://www.abine.com/donottrackme.html (last visited May 24, 2014)
(showing the names of several blocked trackers).
30 lnternet Cookies, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/cookies.shtm
(last visited May 24, 2014); Internet Explorer 10 Privacy Statement for Windows
7 Last update: December 2012, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
us/Internet-explorer/iel0-win7-privacy-statement (last visited May 24, 2014).
3 Internet Cookies, supra note 30.
32 d
" Id.
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can be read only by the website generating the cookie.34 That,
however, is not always the case. Sometimes the cookie can be read
by multiple websites, permitting information-sharing between
several different websites visited by the same person.3 ' Thankfully,
cookies can be blocked,36 although often at the cost of severely
reduced functionality.37 New cookie-like technology dubbed
"canvas fingerprinting," however, may be "virtually impossible to
block."3
Cookies are not the only way an online entity can track a user's
activities. Users are tracked in any number of ways that do not
require the ability to store a cookie on a user's computer or
electronic device. For example, websites39 keep detailed activity
logs of every visitor,40 like an automatically generated visitor log
or guestbook. These logs gather raw user-data, like the
accessing-device's IP address, the access date and time, and cookie
data, if it exists.4' Software then reads and interprets this raw data
to provide the website operator with information about user
behavior.42 Of course, any data directly entered by visitors into
34 id.
35 d.
36 See, e.g., Block or allow cookies, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/
en-us/windows-vista/block-or-allow-cookies (last visited Aug. 9, 2014).
3 See, e.g., Cookies Policy, FUTURE PLC, http://www.futureplc.com/cookies-
policy/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (providing options to opt-out of the use of
cookies, but at the cost of reduced functionality).
38 Julia Angwin, Meet the Online Tracking Device That is Virtually
Impossible to Block, PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/
article/meet-the-online-tracking-device-that-is-virtually-impossible-to-block; see
generally Gunes Acar et al., The Web Never Forgets: Persistent Tracking
Mechanisms in the Wild, https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/-gacar/persistent/
index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) (describing how canvas fingerprinting
and other hard-to-block tracking mechanisms work).
39 Or, more accurately, the server hosting the website.
40 See Sumit Sukhwani, Satish Garla, & Goutam Chakraborty, Paper 100-2012:
Analysis of Clickstream Data Using SAS, SAS GLOBAL FORUM 2012, 1, 1-2
http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedingsl2/100-2012.pdf.
41 See id
42 See, e.g., SPLUNK, http://www.splunk.com/view/splunk/SP-CAAAG57 (last
visited May 24, 2014) (selling data analytics services).
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form fields, like name, contact information, etc., is stored in the
webserver's database. Cookie data, website activity log data, and
form data can then be combined and associated to build a
comprehensive snapshot of a particular visitor's activity on the
website.43
Web beacons are another popular, very simple, and very
effective way of tracking people's online whereabouts without
using a cookie. Each time someone visits a website embedded with
a tracker's web beacon, the tracker is notified, like a blip on a
radar." From the blips, the tracker can surreptitiously track a
visitor's online whereabouts across any website embedded with the
beacon. Embed enough web beacons into enough websites, and a
tracker can learn a great deal about a visitor: everything from the
visitor's political ideology to the visitor's sexual preferences.
2. The Incentive to Track and Collect as Much Data as Possible-
Big Data's Raison d'Etre
Hosting websites and providing services is not cheap, and it
certainly is not free. To the pay the bills, companies often sell ad
space to online advertising agencies eager to reach a broader
audience.45 And when selling ad space pays the bills, information
about the company's electronic visitors is very valuable. The more
information that advertising agency has about a particular
company's electronic visitors, the better the ad agency is able to
43 Much of this is from my own knowledge as a semi-professional web designer
with about nine years of experience. But do not take my word for it. One
Buzzfeed.com staffer listed eighty things Facebook knows about its users just
from form-field data. The list, which is not comprehensive, includes everything
from political and religious views to those friends users search for most. Charlie
Warzel, Here Are 80 Deeply Personal Things that Facebook Knows About You
Right Now, BUZZFEED (May 23, 2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
charliewarzel/here-are-80-deeply-personal-things-that-facebook-knows-about.
44 See Joanna Geary, Tracking the Trackers: What are Cookies? An
introduction to web tracking, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2014, 12:08 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/23/cookies-and-web-tracking-
intro (explaining web beacons).
45 See, e.g., GOOGLE ADSENSE, http://www.google.com/adsense (last visited
May 24, 2014).
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display ads that influence those visitors.46 The more effective the
ad, the more money the advertisement agency makes from its
clients.47 The more money advertising agencies make from
advertising on a particular electronic space, the more money the
host-company can charge for that ad space.48
Such an information and data-driven system encourages ad
space hosts, as well as the advertising agencies that buy ad space,
to collect as much personal data as possible from visitors. Though
a particular website may enjoy access to only its visitors'
information, an advertising agency has access to the visitor
information of all of the electronic spaces where it displays ads
(e.g., websites, smartphone apps, software, console gaming
systems, etc.).49 The ability to compile data from so many different
sources helps advertising agencies create a three-dimensional,
high-detailed image of any particular visitor."o Complex algorithms
46 Jami Oetting, Advertising's Big Data Debate: 10 Views on Whether Data is
Helping or Hurting the Industry, AGENCY POST (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.
agencypost.com/advertisings-big-data-debate- 10-views-on-whether-data-is-helping-or-
hurting-the-industry/ (debating the pros and cons of Big Data in the field of
advertising). I should also note that generating "impressions" is another way for
advertisers to generate revenue, though less than click-throughs. An
"impression" is a view. A click-through is, well, a click.
47 See How does Google make money? What is driving Google's growth?,
GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/corporate/faq.html#toc-money (last visited
Nov. 14, 2014) ("Our proprietary technology automatically matches ads to the
content of the page on which they appear, and advertisers pay us either when a
user clicks on one of its ads or based on the number of times their ads appear on
the Google Network.").
48 See, e.g., Sarah E. Needleman & Jack Marshall, Facebook Ads Become
'Costlier' Choice for Small Businesses, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2014, 3:31 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/facebook-ads-become-costlier-choice-for-small-
businesses-1407341983 (reporting that Facebook is raising advertising rates as it
claims its advertising is producing "better outcomes for its advertisers").
49 See, e.g., Benefits of Pay-Per-Click (PPC) Advertising, GOOGLE ADWORDS,
http://www.google.com/adwords/benefits/#subid-us-en-et-nelsonadshp1rnawhp
(last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (touting Google's omnipresence).
5o See Danny Dover, The Evil Side of Google? Exploring Google's User Data
Collection, THE Moz BLOG (June 24, 2008), http://moz.com/blog/the-evil-side-
of-google-exploring-googles-user-data-collection (documenting all the data
Google has admitted to collecting about it users).
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then track that visitor's electronic movements and place
advertisements on websites, between songs, and before and during
videos that are more likely to influence the visitor."
Facebook and Google have become two of the most pervasive
data-aggregating advertising agencies. Google's AdSense
advertisement system dwarfs most other online ad agencies,
boasting more than two million affiliates.5 2 Facebook's advertising
program is different, but just as massive. Facebook enjoys access
to the data of more than 950 million users." Facebook records
more than 2.5 billion status updates, wall posts, photos, videos, and
comments every day.54 Facebook also collects data about users
visiting any platform that contains a Facebook "Like" button,
whether the Facebook user clicks the "Like" button or not." One
company estimates that these "Like" buttons exist on nearly one
million websites." With access to so much high-quality data, it is
no wonder why Google and Facebook are able to target users and
visitors with such eerily accurate web ads.
B. "Offline" Tracking
Going offline will not stop the hunt; people are tracked even
when they think they are offline. Smartphones, GPS systems,
s1 See, e.g., About Adsense for Your Blog, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/
blogger/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=42534 (last visited May 24, 2014) (discussing
how Google AdSense works).
52 GOOGLE ADSENSE, supra note 45.
Eliza Kern, Facebook Is Collecting Your Data-500 Terabytes a Day,
GIGAOM (Aug. 22, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/08/22/facebook-is-
collecting-your-data-500-terabytes-a-day/.
54 Id. Facebook receives more than 2.7 billion "Likes" per day. Id. Altogether,
more than 500 terabytes (500,000 gigabytes or 0.5 petabytes) of new data is
recorded by Facebook alone every single day. Id. Just one of Facebook's largest
storage server clusters hosts more than 100 petabytes of data. Id.
Riva Richmond, As 'Like' Buttons Spread, So Do Facebook's Tentacles,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/
27/as-like-buttons-spread-so-do-facebooks-tentacles/.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Brad Stone, Ads Posted on Facebook Strike Some as Off-Key,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/technology/
04facebook.html?r-0.
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customer-loyalty cards, video cameras, and even radio frequency
identification ("RFID") devices track the whereabouts, purchasing
habits, and seemingly offline activities of Americans every single
day, even though Americans may not realize it or approve.
1. Smartphones and Things that Connect to Smartphones
Smartphones can do much more than browse the Internet and
host apps. Modem smartphones come equipped with microphones,
high-quality cameras, GPS chips, compasses," accelerometers,59
and gyroscopes.6 0 Separately, each of these on-board devices can
collect a unique type of personal data that in itself can be highly
revealing. But together, these devices can create an intimately
detailed picture of an individual's personal activities.
This functionality is so revolutionary that it has given birth to
an entire movement, called "The Quantified Self' ("QS").
According to Cisco, a technology company apparently hoping to
capitalize on the QS movement, the movement "employs
technology to drive greater self-awareness by tracking data related
to exercise, diet, health maintenance, financial management,
learning, and so forth."6 1 The website quantifiedself.com lists more
than 500 smartphone apps capable of helping people track
themselves.62 For example, one app called "Fitbit" tracks users'
physical activity and sleep.63 Once recorded, user data is uploaded
58 Sara M. Watson, The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All into Activity
Trackers, WIRED (Oct. 10, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.wired.com/
opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-
we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/.
59 Id. An accelerometer measures the proper acceleration of an object. Accelerometer,
THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Accelerometer
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
60 See Watson, supra note 58. A gyroscope is used to detect the precise
orientation of an object in three-dimensional space. Gyroscope, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Gyroscope (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
6 Joseph Bradley, When JoE Gets Personal: The Quantified Self Movement!,
Cisco BLOG (Sept. 10, 2013, 1:33 PM), http://blogs.cisco.com/zzfeatured/when-
ioe-gets-personal-the-quantified-self-movement/.
62 QUANTIFIED SELF, http://quantifiedself.com/guide/ (last visited May 25,
2014) (listing over 500 tools).631 d
[VOL. 16: 377388
When Big Data Meets Big Brother
to Fitbit, which then processes the data and provides users with
visualizations of their physical activity and sleep.64 Another app,
"Digifit," is a "full suite of Apple apps that records heart rate,
pace, speed, cadence, and power of your running, cycling and other
athletic endeavors."" Of course, once collected, the data can then
be uploaded to various athletic-training websites." "Moodpanda"
tracks a user's mood." "Momento" allows users to type journals
entries, upload photos, and then tag them with contacts in the
user's address book, GPS location data, and other tags.68
As revolutionary as it is already, the QS movement has just
begun. In addition to the suite of chips and sensors onboard
smartphones, the increasing availability of cheap sensors outside of
the smartphone is driving the QS movement even smaller, even
more precise, and even more pervasive.69 Soon, clothing,70 shoes,"
headbands,72 and pills" will be embedded with small sensors7 4 to
help smartphones track every moment, every breath, every blink,
every sugar high, every sugar low, every REM cycle, and, yes,
every bowel movement.
The QS movement, as invasive as it is, is at least the result of
the people's choice to track themselves. Businesses, however, do
not always inform customers of their efforts to track consumer
data. Google has been caught secretly tracking users' walking and
64 Id.
65 id.
66 Id.
67id.
68d.
69 Joseph Bradley, A Pill That Tracks Your Health? The Reality Of the
'Quantified Self Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2013, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-bradley/cisco-quantified-self-movement_b
3907545.html.
70 Id.
1 Id.
72 Id.
7 Id.
74 id
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bicycling activity." Apple, through its iPhone, was caught tracking
users' geographic locations based upon cellphone tower and
Wi-Fi-network triangulation. One company in London, called
"Renew," is beta-testing the use of Wi-Fi-enabled trash cans to
collect information from passersby's smartphones, without any
warning whatsoever." Most recently, Microsoft was caught
reading at least one of its user's emails just after launching a public
advertisement campaign against Google for similar practices.
2. Cameras, Loyalty Cards, and In-Store Tracking
Smartphones are not the only way businesses can watch and
learn from their customers. Even customers who do not have a
computer of any kind cannot escape the ever-watchful eyes of
businesses seeking to learn more about their customers.
Though businesses are reluctant to talk about it, some
businesses, especially big-chain stores, begin monitoring a
customer the moment the customer parks in the store's parking
7 Kashmir Hill, Big Healthy Brother: 'Google Now' Surprises Users by Tracking
Miles Walked and Biked, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2012/11/02/big-healthy-brother-google-now-surprises-users-by-
tracking-miles-walked-and-biked/.
76 Watson, supra note 58.
7 Anthony Gucciardi, Wi-fl Trashcans Now Silently Tracking Your Smartphone
Data, STORY LEAK (Aug. 12, 2013, 3:15 AM), http://www.storyleak.com/
wi-fi-trashcans-tracking-your-smartphone-data/. Though this occurred in London,
there is no reason to think that this couldn't happen in the United States,
especially given that Europe protects people's privacy much more rigorously
than the United States. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Europe's 'Right To Be
Forgotten' Clashes With U.S. Right To Know, FORBES (May 16, 2014, 8:45
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/05/16/europes-right-to-be-
forgotten-clashes-with-u-s-right-to-know/ (reporting on how Europe's robust
effort to protect personal privacy, but noting that this may just reflect a
difference in Europe's philosophy about the role of government in protecting
people's privacy).
7 Javed Anwer, Caught Red-handed, Microsoft Promises Not to Snoop on
Emails, TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 29, 2014, 3:03 AM), http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Caught-red-handed-Microsoft-promises-not-to-
snoop-on-emails/articleshow/32870284.cms.
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lot." Video cameras around the parking lot record the vehicle and
license plate."o Once the customer enters the store, cameras hidden
in tiny holes in shelving, the eyes of mannequins, and elsewhere
record the customer's movement, age, sex, ethnicity, and facial
expressions as she moves around the store and interacts with
various products for sale."' When the customer purchases
something with a credit card or uses a customer-loyalty card, the
store then associates the in-store behavioral data with a real person
and that person's account information.82
Google recently released" a new analytics program called
"Universal Analytics" that tracks a person's physical location all of
the time-even when the person is not using any Google apps-to
enable big business to tie a person's out-of-store data with a
person's in-store behavior.84 Google has been tracking people's
GPS location for years," but unlike regular GPS-tracking,
Universal Analytics detects when a person enters a store and then
7 See Chris Moran, 4 Ways Retail Stores Are Monitoring Your Every Move,
CONSUMERIST (Mar. 27, 2013), http://consumerist.com/2013/03/27/4-ways-
retail-stores-are-monitoring-your-every-move/.
80 id.
8' Id. These tactics may seem extreme, but businesses believe that these tactics
help them to truly understand their customers. For example, video cameras in
mannequins track eye movement and facial expressions because businesses want
to know whether a consumer reacts favorably or unfavorably to certain products.
Businesses stick video cameras in shelves to see whether consumers read labels,
search for deals, or simply snap-up their favorite items. The additional
information about age, sex, and ethnicity helps businesses to learn about
whether different demographic groups react differently to the same product.
Knowing, for example, that women select a particular food product more than
men might help that retailer more efficiently target its ads.
82 See id (discussing how the data can be tied to other data).
8 Kristian Petterson, Google's Universal Analytics - Ready to Jump In?,
BUSINESS2COMMUNITY (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.business2community.com/
business-intelligence/googles-universal-analytics-ready-jump-01046094.
84
.John McDermott, Google Takes Its Tracking into the Real World, DIGIDAY
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://digiday.com/platforms/google-tracking/; Paul Lear, In-Store
(Offline) Tracking with Google's Universal Analytics, BLAST AM (Aug. 25, 2013),
http://www.blastam.com/blog/index.php/2013/08/offline-tracking-with-universal-
analytics/.
85 McDermott, supra note 84.
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informs the store of the user's Google searches for that business.8 6
One author described this kind of offline-online data tracking as
the "Holy Grail" of data analytics."
3. The "Internet of Things"
The "Internet of Things" refers to the prospect that nearly
everything that can be connected to the Internet will be in the near
future." According to one study, by the year 2020, more than 30
billion devices could be wirelessly connected to the Internet.89
Everything from televisions to refrigerators to electricity meters
will be capable of recording data and transferring that data to third
parties, with or without a user's knowledge or consent.
Of course, the "Internet of Things" may provide significant
benefits, such as a refrigerators that can warn people that food has
gone bad,90 or smart electricity meters that permit people to make
more informed decisions about their electricity usage.9' But the
data-collection and data-sharing activities of things connected to
the Internet is not always so obvious to consumers. Nor is it always
a choice. Take for example, the story of the British blogger,
Doctorbeet. 2 After purchasing a new LG Smart TV, he discovered
that it was secretly logging his viewing activities and uploading the
8 Petterson, supra note 83.
" See Catherine Crump & Matthew Harwood, Big Brother Is Coming:
Google, Mass Surveillance, and the Rise of the "Internet of Things," SALON
(Mar. 26, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/26/big brotheris_
here google mass-surveillanceandtheriseoftheInternetof thingspartne
r/ (defining the "Internet of Things"). Perhaps the biggest supporter of the
Internet of Things is Cisco Systems, one of the world's largest manufacturers of
networking equipment. Cisco calls it the "Internet of Everything," or loE. The
Internet of Everything, Cisco, http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/innov/
IoE.html (last visited May 25, 2014).89 See Crump & Harwood, supra note 88.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., What Is A SmartMeter?, PG&E, http://www.pge.com/en/myhome/
customerservice/smartmeter/index.page (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (discussing
the benefits of smart meters).
92 See Crump & Harwood, supra note 88 (describing Doctorbeet's experience
with a snooping television).
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data, unencrypted, to LG.93 Doctorbeet then discovered that this
was a default feature. 4 But even after turning off the feature, the
television continued to monitor and share his viewing activity."
Or consider that, starting in September 2014, a recent federal
government regulation will require manufacturers to equip nearly
every vehicle they produce with a "black box" containing an
"Event Data Recorder." 96 The data recorder will constantly monitor
the host-vehicle's speed, braking, driving patterns, and yes,
location.97 It is unclear who owns the recorder and the data it
collects.9 8 At this point, there is nothing to stop insurance
companies, for example, from contractually requiring
policyholders to submit the black boxes to regular inspection,
storage, and analysis, whether or not the vehicle's owner also owns
the black box and the data it collects. Subprime auto-title lenders
already track the GPS location of the vehicles debtors pledge as
collateral.99 These lenders even have the ability to remotely prevent
a debtor's vehicle from starting when that debtor misses a
payment."'
C. Big Data
Data collected by private parties, online and off, is often sold to
additional private parties. In fact, selling databases of information
about user activity has become a multi-billion dollar industry of
9 Id.
94 Id.
95 id.
9 6 Advertorial Published in Wheels, New Laws Emerge as Technology Impacts
Cars and Driving, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/business/auto/2014/03/27/New-laws-emerge-as-
technology-impacts-cars-and-driving/stories/201403270171.
97 id.
98 d
99 See Robert Szypko, Your Car Won't Start. Did You Make The Loan Payment?,
NPR (Oct. 16, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/aIltechconsidered/2014/
10/16/356693782/your-car-wont-start-did-you-make-the-loan-payment (reporting
about data-collection and repossession activities of subprime auto-title lenders).0 0 See id.
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trackers, aggregators, analyzers, and buyers of people's data'o'
known collectively as "Big Data."'O2 The companies that collect
user data and then resell it as part of the Big Data industry are
often called "data brokers."'0 3 The largest Big Data broker is
Acxiom.'04 Acxiom claims that its database contains about 1,500
data points for each of the 500 million people it tracks.o5
The reach of data brokers is so vast that it recently drew the
attention of the United States Senate. 0 6 The Senate Commerce
Committee investigated the nine largest data aggregators'
"collection, use, and sale of consumer data for marketing
purposes."o' The committee learned that Big Data brokers collect a
"huge volume of detailed information on hundreds of millions of
consumers," which includes offline data.' 8 The committee report
also noted that these brokers "amass data without the direct
interaction with consumers" and even contractually prohibit the
businesses that purchase data from these brokers from disclosing to
101 See Dave Feinleib, The Big Data Landscape, FORBES (June 19, 2012, 1:01
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davefeinleib/2012/06/19/the-big-data-landscape/
(discussing the Big Data ecosystem).
10 2 See Steve Lohr, IDC Sizes Up the Big Data Market, N.Y. TIMES BITS
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/idc-
sizes-up-the-big-data-market/?_php=true&_type=blogs& r-0 (discussing the "Big
Data" industry).
103 Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-
your-personal-information/.
104 id.
105 Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y.
TIMES (June 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-
the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all.
106 See generally OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS MAJORITY STAFF,
S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., AND TRANS., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA
BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR
MARKETING PURPOSES (2013), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/
?a=Files.Serve&File id=bd5dad8b-a9e8-4fe9-a2a7-bl7f4798ee5a (investigating
the activities of data aggregators).
107 Id.
IosId.
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consumers the sources of consumer data-something the
committee called a "veil of secrecy."' 0 9
Facebook and Google face continuing questions about what
they do with all of the data they collect. For example, one
Bulgarian blogger and digital-rights activist allegedly purchased
over 1.1 million Facebook data-entries, which included
information like Facebook names, user IDs, and email addresses."
A Facebook investigation found that the data had been obtained by
merely "scrapping" (harvesting with bots) users' "public" data."'
But some question this conclusion because at least some of the
users' email addresses were not publically available." 2 And even if
Facebook does not "sell" user data, it still permits other parties to
access user data.'" Application developers that create apps for
Facebook need only receive a Facebook user's click of the "I
agree" button before the user's data is sent directly to the
developer." 4 What those developers do with the data is unknown,
though Facebook's contract with developers states, "You will not
sell user data."" 5
D. Big Data Will Know You Better Than You Know Yourself
Data's value is in its predictive powers. There is little benefit to
recording, storing, sharing, and aggregating data about people if
doing so does not accurately describe people's habits, behaviors,
I0 9 Id.
1o Andy Greenberg, Facebook Investigating How Bulgarian Man Bought 1.1
Million Users' Email Addresses for Five Dollars, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:39
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/10/25/facebook-investigating-
how-bulgarian-man-bought-1-1-million-users-email-addresses-for-five-dollars/.
' " Id.111 Id.
112 jd
113 See Max Read, How to Stop Facebook from Sharing Your Information with
Third Parties, GAWKER (Oct. 18, 2010, 1:15 AM), http://gawker.com/5666325/
how-to-stop-facebook-from-sharing-your-information-with-third-parties (showing
how to stop Facebook from sharing app data with third parties).
14 Greenberg, supra note 110.
"5 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
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and preferences.' 16 The inability of people to know themselves, or
be honest with themselves, is one of the central premises of the QS
movement, and why the movement holds great promise for
improving people's health."'
But individual tidbits of data can be deceptive. Statisticians and
sophisticated consumers alike know the value of a good sample
size.'" Small sample sizes are prone to error because in a small
sample, no one knows whether the data is anomalous or consistent
with the population as a whole." 9 For example, the voting habits of
Orange County, California are historically inconsistent with the
voting habits of California as a whole.'2 0 A politician running in
Los Angeles County would do well to ignore the voter data from
Orange County'2 ' and visa-versa.
The same can be said of an individual. One bit of data about a
particular consumer-she bought batteries-is of little value to
advertisers. Add to that other data-she bought batteries from a
sex shop-and advertisers learn something potentially intimate and
valuable about that consumer. Add even more data-that the sex
shop was 1,000 miles from her home and that the woman is 65
years old-and the advertiser may question the implications raised
116 One could make the argument that individuals who value privacy stand to
benefit from recording inaccurate data about themselves. A pro-privacy startup
might turn this tactic into a profitable business model. Still, it probably would
not prevent businesses from tracking and collecting data.
" See Gary Wolf, The Data-Driven Life, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/05/02/magazine/02self-measurement-t.html?pagewanted=all
(extolling the virtues of the QS movement).
'
18 See, e.g., Sample Size Determination, DEFINITIONS, http://www.definitions.net/
definition/sample%20size%20determination (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
1' Id.
I2 0 See Adam Nagoumey, Orange County Is No Longer Nixon Country, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/us/politics/30orange.html
(discussing Orange County as a historically Republican stronghold in the middle
of a state that is known for being a Democratic stronghold).
121 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Election
Results, Los ANGELES COUNTY REGISTRAR-RECORDER/COUNTY CLERK,
http://rrccmain.co.1a.ca.us/14062043/ 2 043 GOVERNOR _Frame.htm (last visited
June 8, 2014) (showing that, for example, in the last election the county voted
overwhelmingly for a Democrat for Governor).
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by the smaller set of data. Finally, add in a little bit more data-the
woman bought an insulin pump six months before, and the
particular device she bought is known for battery trouble-and the
data begins to suggest that the woman did not purchase batteries
for a sex device. Rather, it would appear that the woman bought
batteries at a sex shop because she was diabetic and desperate to
replace the dead or dying batteries in her insulin pump.
Advertising sex toys to this woman might generate far less interest
than advertising medical devices associated or related to diabetes.
The advertiser might further benefit from this knowledge by
advertising this woman "long-lasting" batteries or
"energy-efficient" insulin pumps. This would not only increase
profits for the company, it would also provide a helpful service to
the woman. The point being, of course, that the more data an
advertiser has about an individual person, the more successful an
advertiser will be at selling that person goods and services.
The incentive, therefore, is to collect as much data as possible
about every single individual, from every possible angle, and from
every possible quadrant of their lives. Data collected in-store is
more valuable when paired with data collected through the
smartphone. That data is even more valuable if paired with data
about what happens inside the person's home. And so on and so
forth, until the advertiser has a rich trove of data so personal, so
intimate, and so private, that the advertiser knows the person better
than the people around that person do, maybe even better than the
person knows herself.
Google's entry into industries seemingly unrelated to email or
search engines makes sense if it is seen not as a tech company, but
rather as a Big Data advertising company seeking to dominate the
future of advertisement. Google's desire to collect as much
information about people as it can from as many sources as
possible can then be explained. If Google can combine data from
people's email, smartphone, thermostat,'2 2 robots,'2 3 contact
122 Aaron Tilley, Google Acquires Smart Thermostat Maker Nest for 3.2
Billion, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2014, 4:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
aarontilley/20 14/01/13/google-acquires-nest-for-3-2-billion/.
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lenses,'24 glasses,'2 5 self-driving car,12 6 etc., then it can gain a
significant and lasting advantage over its fellow advertisers who
may not have such pervasive access to people's lives. Google's
Director of Engineering, Ray Kurzweil, all but confirmed that this
is Google's goal when he said that he believes that Google will
soon "know the answer to your question before you have asked it,"
and "will have read every email you've ever written, every
document, every idle thought you've ever tapped into a
search-engine box."' 27 He added that "[Google] will know you
better than your intimate partner does," and "[b]etter, perhaps, than
even yourself." 2 8
E. Data vs. Metadata
Data can, arguably, be divided into two types: the content of a
person's communications on the one hand and the non-content
information about the person's communications on the other.129
The content of a person's communications is the message
itself-the speech, the picture, the text, the email, etc.' 30 Metadata
123 Steve Henn, With Google's Robot-Buying Binge, A Hat Tip To The Future,
NPR (Mar. 17, 2014, 4:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/
2014/03/17/290888529/with-googles-robot-buying-binge-a-hat-tip-to-the-future
("In less than a year, Google has bought more than a half-dozen robotics
companies, setting the industry abuzz.").
124 Introducing Our Smart Contact Lens Project, GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 16,
2014, 4:18 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/introducing-our-smart-
contact-lens.html.
125 Google Glass, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/glass/start/ (last visited
May 25, 2014).
126 Chris Urmson, The Latest Chapter for The Self-Driving Car: Mastering City
Street Driving, GOOGLE BLOG (Apr. 28, 2014), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2014/04/the-latest-chapter-for-self-driving-car.html.
127 Google Will Soon Know You Better than Your Spouse Does, Top Exec Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/02/23/ray-kurzweil_n_4842972.html.
1 28 id.
12 9 See, e.g., Metadata: Piecing Together a Privacy Solution, ACLU OF CAL. (Feb.
2014), https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/Metadata%20report% 20FINAL%
202%2021%2014%20cover/o20%2B%20inside%20for/20web%20%283%29.pdf
(introducing the public to metadata).
3 0 See id. at 3 (defining "content").
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is information about the communication minus the message
itself."' Metadata answers questions like, when did the person send
the message? To whom? From what account? How? From what
geographic location? How many characters was the text? Did the
email include a picture? How big was the picture? Did the picture
include any information about who created it? 32 And so on.
Those first learning about metadata might mistakenly believe
that metadata is too removed from the content of the data to say
anything valuable. But this belief about metadata, however
understandable, could not be further from the truth.'" Metadata can
reveal as much if not more than the content of the communication
itself. Imagine a simple text message that reads, "Here." The
content of the communication is vague and reveals almost nothing
at all. Someone is somewhere. But what if the metadata revealed
that this message was sent by a woman from an abortion clinic to a
man at his home? All of the sudden, the picture is clear. In this
case, the content of the message conveyed to the man is far less
intimate and revealing than the metadata about that message.
It is no wonder why the cover of a new American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") report on metadata features the picture
of a woman's face layered over pieces of a puzzle.'3 4 In a way,
metadata can be pieces of a puzzle that, when put together, reveal
something quite significant. In its report, the ACLU notes the
extent of information that can be revealed by metadata.' Metadata
reveals everything from "our presence at a hospital, a political
rally, or a religious ceremony," to "our calls to an addiction
support hotline, a job recruiter, or a dating service," and "our
purchases of birth control or books on fighting depression."'36
Metadata can, perhaps more than the content of a message, be
"inherently communicative.""' The ACLU explains that "it's not
131 See id (distinguishing "metadata" from "content").
132 See id. (defining "metadata").
133 See id at 5 (explaining how metadata can be so revealing).
134 at 1.
135 See id. at 5 (discussing "communicative" metadata).
Id.
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hard to uncover an individual's dissatisfaction with his job, marital
difficulties, or health status if you know that he is in frequent
contact with a recruiter, divorce attorney, or cancer treatment
center."' In another example, the ACLU adds, "it's even easier to
'infer' a person's sexual orientation or political allegiance if you
can reveal her connection with the LGBT Choir or the local Tea
Party chapter."' 39
The distinction between metadata and the content of data can
also be unclear. Consider URLs. URLs are simultaneously content
and metadata. The text of the URL, if typed by a person into a web
browser's address bar, is the content of a communication. A person
literally types letters and numbers into a text box. It is the digital
equivalent of an eighteenth-century author quilling a missive to
one person requesting information about another. The content of
that missive-the request for information-is, without a doubt,
content, not metadata. But, at the same time, the text typed is also
an address-a destination. It is therefore not only the question
quilled into the missive itself, but also the place where the courier
is to deliver the missive-metadata. Thus, it is content and
non-content, both at the same time.
The same is true even when a person does not type a URL
directly into her Internet browser's address bar, but rather types a
sentence into a search box. The search terms, like the inquiry
quilled into the missive, are the content of the communication.
The web user is asking Google to find information. On the other
hand, when the user clicks the Google search button, the text
that appears in her Internet browser's address bar is
"https://www.google.com/#q=oklahoma+law+on+abortions."l 40 That
text is an address, a destination-metadata. But it is all too easy to
figure out from that metadata that this person searched for
"Oklahoma law on abortions." So, the search is both data and
metadata, content and non-content.
1 Id.
I39 id.
140 See for yourself. Google "Oklahoma law on abortions."
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The distinction between metadata and the content of data is
probably irrelevant to the average person. People, like the woman
in the abortion clinic and the man at home, probably care far more
about whether their messages are received by the intended
recipient and whether they are kept private. The distinction is
nonetheless critical because the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to their messages-and its many privacy
protections-is currently determined by this seemingly arbitrary
distinction.
F. The Myth of "Anonymous" Data
Most Internet users would like to be anonymous when
online.'4 1 Indeed, one study showed that "86% percent of Internet
users have taken steps online to remove or mask their digital
footprints."'4 2 Companies are aware of people's privacy concerns
and often justify their data-collection programs by claiming that
the data they collect is anonymous and that it does not reveal any
personally-identifiable information.'43 Many people then use those
companies' services under the mistaken belief that their activities,
including their online and offline activities and whereabouts, are
anonymous and will not, at some later date, come back to haunt
them.
But electronic anonymity is a myth.'44 People's online, and
141 See Lee Rainie et al., Pew Internet, Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online,
PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT (Sept. 5, 2013), http://pewIntemet.org/Reports/
2013/Anonymity-online.aspx (polling on online anonymity).
142 id
143 See, e.g., Collection of Anonymous Location Data, GOOGLE, https://support.
google.com/gmm/answer/2839958?hl=en (last visited May 25, 2014) ("You can
help improve Google, including products and services like traffic, by allowing
location data to be anonymously crowdsourced by Google's location service
from your device.").
14 4 See Kim Zetter, Anonymous Phone Location Data Not So Anonymous,
Researchers Find, WIRED (Mar. 27, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2013/03/anonymous-phone-location-data/ ("Anonymized mobile
phone location data produces a GPS fingerprint that can be easily used to
identify a user based on little more than tracking the pings a phone makes to cell
towers, a new study shows."); Amazon's Online Workforce Not So Anonymous
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increasingly offline, activities conducted under the belief that those
activities were private or at least anonymous, have come back to
haunt them. Consider AOL's disastrous but purposeful disclosure
of more than 20 million search queries made by over 650 thousand
of its users back in 2006.1'4 The AOL team that released the data
said that the posting was meant to benefit academic research.14 6
Once AOL realized what the supposedly anonymized data revealed
about their users, it quickly removed the data, but not before the
damage had been done. 14 7 Though the AOL team had attempted to
anonymize the data by replacing the AOL usemames with generic
numbers, de-anonymizing the data proved all too easy due to the
nature of the data collected on each user. The New York Times
detailed the relatively simple process reporters used to identify one
user.
No. 4417749 conducted hundreds of searches over a three-month
period on topics ranging from "numb fingers" to "60 single men" to
"dog that urinates on everything."
And search by search, click by click, the identity of AOL user No.
4417749 became easier to discern. There are queries for "landscapers in
Lilburn, Ga," several people with the last name Arnold and "homes
sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia [sic]."
It did not take much investigating to follow that data trail to
Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga.,
After All, UNIV. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.utexas.edu/
news/2013/03/27/amazons-online-workforce-not-so-anonymous-after-all/ ("Most
people assume that Amazon.com's massive online workforce is anonymous, but
a study by researchers from The University of Texas at Austin and five other
universities has uncovered a security vulnerability that makes it relatively easy
to uncover many workers' personally identifying information."); Yves-Alexandre
de Montjoye et al., Unique In The Crowd: The Privacy Bounds Of Human
Mobility, SCIENTIFIC REPORTS (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nature.com/srep/
2013/130325/srepO376/full/srepO376.html ("[1]n a dataset where the location
of an individual is specified hourly, and with a spatial resolution equal to that
given by the carrier's antennas, four spatio-temporal points are enough to
uniquely identify 95% of the individuals.").
145 Dawn Kawamoto & Elinor Mills, AOL Apologizes for Release of User
Search Data, CNET (Aug. 7, 2006, 2:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/AOL-
apologizes-for-release-of-user-search-data/2100-1030 3-6102793.html.
I46 id.
147 id
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frequently researches her friends' medical ailments and loves her three
dogs. "Those are my searches," she said, after a reporter read part of
the list to her.148
Other users' searches were not so benign. Consider what AOL
user No. 2281868's searches revealed about him or her. According
to Consumerist.com, the user is "into jazz ... bestiality ...
pictures of old ladies who look like Hilary [sic] Clinton naked. . ."
and "wants to find black gay overbite porn . . . ."149 The list
continues.' Another user's bizarre and somewhat frightening
Internet searches inspired the creation of a play called "User 927."
The play, a self-described "thriller about cyberstalking, search
engines, and the way information is obtained, manipulated, and
released in our wired world," received a staged reading in New
York in 2009.1" Privacy advocates still maintain a searchable
database of data derived from the AOL disclosure as a warning to
people everywhere about how dangerous it is to release such
"anonymized" information. 5 2 It is not hard to see how the release
of such data could generate enormous reputational damage.' It is
148 Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No.
4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/
technology/09aol.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
149AOL User 2281868 Looking for Gay Black Superman with an Overbite,
CONSUMERIST (Aug. 9, 2006), http://consumerist.com/2006/08/09/aol-user-
2281 8 6 8-looking-for-gay-black-superman-with-an-overbite/. Beware, I have only
listed some of the user's searches. Some of the user's searches are even more
graphic and may be upsetting.
50 id.
Ben Popken, AOL User 927 Gets Staged Reading in New York,
CONSUMERIST (June 8, 2009), http://consumerist.com/2009/06/08/aol-user-927-
gets-staged-reading-in-new-york/.
152 See Search AOL User Searches Like the Pros, CONSUMERIST (Aug. 9,
2006), http://consumerist.com/2006/08/09/search-aol-user-searches-like-the-pros/
(retaining the search records for all to see). Again, just as a warning, user
searches can be graphic and may be upsetting. Proceed only if you are an adult
and only if you are capable of maturely handling real people's very real Internet
searches.
1 As harmful to privacy as the AOL disclosure was, the data releases
represent only a tiny chunk of the data available on the Internet. Since 2006,
databases have grown to incomprehensible size and complexity, connecting user
actions to personalized user data. Since 2006, sophisticated computer programs
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also not hard to see that these users mistakenly believed their
searches were either private or anonymous, and depended on that
belief.
III. HOW AND WHY BIG BROTHER OBTAINS BIG DATA
The Third-Party Doctrine holds that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment do not apply to information that a person
knowingly exposes to others.'54 The doctrine, in theory, renders the
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and
seizure almost totally inapplicable to data obtained by the
government through private, nongovernmental parties, like
businesses.' 5 Having detailed the extent to which data is collected
by private parties, this section explains why government would
want to obtain Big Data and details how the government regularly
taps into that data, thus blurring the lines between first-hand
government surveillance, which is regulated by the Fourth
Amendment, and second-hand surveillance through private parties,
which currently is not.'56
A. Why Government Wants Big Data
From national security to healthcare to income eligibility,' the
government has plenty of reasons to obtain Big Data. According to
have been developed to help advertisers understand such immense piles of data,
making it even more likely now that a small amount of information would reveal
the identity of a user. Moreover, de-anonymizing data requires very little
information. Even a small dataset of information associated with real names can
be used as a cross reference to de-anonymize a much bigger database. One set of
researchers found that "87 percent of the population in the United States, 216
million of 248 million, could likely be uniquely identified by their five-digit ZIP
code, combined with their gender and date of birth." Bruce Schneier, Why
'Anonymous'Data Sometimes isn't, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2007), http://archive.wired.com/
politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/ 2 0 0 7 /1 2/securitymatters_ 1213.
114 See infra Part IV.C.
' See infra Part IV.C.
'
56 See infra Part IV.B.
157See Melanie Hicken, What Information Is the Government Buying About
You, CNN (Oct. 30, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/30/pf/
government-data-broker/ (documenting government data collection and why).
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its website, IBM's Big Data services can help the government with
threat prediction and prevention; social program fraud, waste, and
errors; tax compliance, fraud, and abuse; and crime prediction and
prevention.' IBM adds, "From crime prevention to transportation,
defense, national security, revenue management, environmental
stewardship and social services, governments must wrestle every
day with managing and using this data."l 59 According to the
McKinsey Global Institute's "Big Data Report," governments in
Europe "could save more than C100 billion ($149 billion) in
operational efficiency improvements alone by using big data."6 o
The estimated amount does not include potential savings from
using Big Data to reduce fraud and errors and to boost the
collection of tax revenues. 6 ' And according to a popular tech
website for government administrators, Big Data offers
administrators the ability to "make better decisions" faster,
"improve mission outcomes," "identify and reduce inefficiencies,"
identify and "eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse," "improve
productivity," "boost ROI," and "enhance transparency and
service."' 62
Even if these benefits are overblown, it is not hard to see that
government, if it has not already, will turn to Big Data in the hope
of achieving better outcomes for its citizens. In March of 2012, the
White House, along with several other governmental agencies,
announced a $200 million dollar "Big Data Research and
Development Initiative."l6 3 The initiative promises to "greatly
158Big Data for Government, IBM, http://www-01.ibm.com/software/data/
bigdata/industry-government.html (last visited June 1, 2014).
5 9 id.
160 James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation,
Competition, and Productivity, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, 1 (June 2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/-/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/
MGI/Research/Technology%20and%20Innovation/Big%2OData/MGI bigdata
full report.ashx.
161 Id.
162 8 Benefits of Big Data for State and Local Governments, STATE TECH
MAGAZINE (May 30, 2013), http://www.statetechmagazine.com/article/2013/05/
8-benefits-big-data-state-and-local-governments.
163 Press, supra note 13.
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improve the tools and techniques needed to access, organize, and
glean discoveries from huge volumes of digital data."1 64 And
according to one writer, state and local governments have already
tapped into the power of Big Data to "relieve traffic congestion,
monitor public utilities, evaluate and predict crime, follow
education trends, and keep tabs on public resources."165
B. Distinguishing First-Hand Data Collection from Second-Hand
Data Collection
The Government can gather data in a variety of ways. Those
methods can be divided into two basic categories: the government
can gather data first-hand, from the target itself, or second-hand,
from a third party with whom the target shared its data. When the
government gathers data first-hand, its activities likely constitute a
search and the Fourth Amendment's protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures apply."' When government
gathers data second-hand from private parties, the Third-Party
Doctrine says that the data-gathering is not a search and that the
Fourth Amendment, for the most part, does not apply.' 7
First-hand data-gathering includes most traditional forms of
police surveillance. Law enforcement regularly observes suspects
with its own eyes and ears, can track a suspect's whereabouts by
following him, and with the appropriate authorization, can search
the suspect's home or property. Law enforcement can even
surreptitiously record the activities of a suspect. And if all of those
methods fail to provide enough information, the government can
simply ask the suspect for information. Even then, in civil lawsuits
between the Government and a private party, if the private party
refuses to talk to the government, the government can force him,
164 Id.
165 Jason Shueh, Big Data Could Bring Government Big Benefits, Gov. TECH.
(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/data/Big-Data-Could-Bring-Govemments-
Big-Benefits.html.
16 6 See infra Part IV.A.
167 See infra Part IV.B. Technically, content data is still protected by the
Fourth Amendment. This subtle yet important distinction is discussed more in
Part IV.B.
[VOL. 16: 377406
When Big Data Meets Big Brother
her, or in the case of a business, it, to speak via use of a subpoena
or, after a suit commences, depositions and even trial
examination.'68
Second-hand data-gathering requires the government to gather
data from a private party for information about the activities of the
suspect. The private parties can be human beings who witnessed
the target say or do something. But private parties can also include
machines or objects, owned by private parties that "witnessed" the
target say or do something.'69 Google's, Sprint's, Facebook's,
Apple's, and Twitter's information about the activities of people
using their networks, phones, and computers is, to the government,
second-hand data about a suspect's activities. Unlike information
acquired by human witnesses, however, information acquired by
computers and machines is not subject to the same kind of
reliability concerns that plague human witnesses.'70 Unlike
information stored in a human brain, data stored in a machine can
be stored accurately for long periods of time and be easily
combined with other data to paint a highly-detailed portrait of a
suspect's activities.
168 The Government may sue businesses or individuals civilly. Consumer
protection is an example of such a lawsuit in which the State seeks data on an
individual or business for the purposes of civil, not criminal prosecution. See,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (West 2014) (giving the Ohio Attorney
General the power to Subpoena information for civil consumer protection
lawsuits). The Defendant of a civil suit can always assert their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. But if the Defendant does, then the
Defendant may lose the ability to defend themselves in the civil suit.
.16 9 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.l (1979) (describing a pen
register).
170 See Laura Engelhardt, The Problem With Eyewitness Testimony:
Commentary on a Talk by Barbara Tversky & George Fisher, I STANFORD
JOURNAL LEGAL STUDIES 25 (1999), available at http://agora.stanford.edu/sjls/
images/pdf/engelhardt.pdf (discussing problems of reliability with eyewitness
testimony).
JAN. 2015]1 407
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
C. The Size and Scope of the Government's Second-Hand
Data-Collection Efforts
While it is impossible to fully document the government's
second-hand data-collection efforts, it is clear that the government
regularly collects large amounts of data about its citizens from
private parties, whether for criminal or civil investigations, or for
national security purposes.
Facebook revealed that for a period of six months ending on
December 31, 2012, federal, state, and local governments
requested data on Facebook users between 9,000 and 10,000
times."' The Government inquired into the activities of 18,000 to
19,000 users. 7 2 Microsoft revealed over that same 6-month period,
the government received between 6,000 and 7,000 national
security warrants affecting between 31,000 and 32,000 users.'7 3
Google regularly reports government requests for information
about its users.174 It reports that government entities in the United
States requested data about its users nearly 11,000 times.' This
data does not include Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISA court") orders, which Google says it cannot share.'76
Unlike Microsoft and Facebook, Google breaks down the means
that the government uses to gather this data. 77 According to
Google, 68% of U.S. government requests are subpoenas, 22%
171 Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Releases Data, Including All National
Security Requests (June 14, 2013) (on file with author), available at
http://newsroom.fb.com/News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-
Security-Requests.
I72 d.
17 Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft's U.S. Law Enforcement and National
Security Requests for Last Half of 2012 (June 14, 2013) (on file with author),
available at http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft on the issues/archive/2013/
06/14/microsoft-s-u-s-law-enforcement-and-national-security-requests-for-last-
half-of-2012.aspx.
174 Richard Salgado, Government Requests for User Information Double Over
Three Years, GOOGLE BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2013/1 1/govemment-requests-for-user.html.
76 id.
Id.
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warrants, 6% other court orders, 2% pen registers, and 1% from
emergency disclosure requests.'
Despite the reputational damage the NSA suffered due to the
Edward Snowden leaks, the NSA is moving full-steam ahead with
Big Data collection orders of magnitude larger than anything ever
seen or done before. The NSA is currently constructing a 100,000
square foot, $1.2 billion data center in Utah. Maintenance costs
alone are calculated at $20 million per year.' The center will
employ 100 or so technicians and will allow NSA agents to
connect remotely from anywhere in the world."'o The data capacity
is rumored to be 5 zettabytes, which is the data equivalent of 1.25
trillion DVDs." Some estimates suggest the collection capacity
reaches I yottabyte, or 250 trillion DVDs.18 2 But some of these
estimates are hard to believe because of just how staggeringly large
that amount of data actually is, considering that global Internet
traffic in the year 2015 is expected to reach only 1 zettabyte.',"
But the government's thirst for second-hand Big Data, for all
the reasons outlined by IBM and other Big Data companies, cannot
be confined to investigations. States, for example, have been
purchasing income data from credit bureaus like Equifax for some
time now to help determine eligibility for state-run programs like
welfare.184
179 d
179Howard Berkes, Booting Up: New NSA Data Farm Takes Root in Utah,
NPR (Sept. 23, 2013, 5:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/
2013/09/23/225381 5 96/booting-up-new-nsa-data-farm-takes-root-in-utah.
18o Id.
18 Id.
182 d.
183 Thomas Barnett, Jr., The Dawn of the Zettabyte Era, Cisco BLOGS (June
23, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://blogs.cisco.com/news/the-dawn-of-the-zettabyte-
era-infographic/.
184 Hicken, supra note 157.
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D. The Many Ways Government Collects Second-Hand Data from
Private Parties
The government can obtain second-hand data from private
parties in a variety of ways. First, the government can simply ask
for it. According to Google, nearly 1% of requests for its user data
from law enforcement are emergency requests.' A bill that has
been proposed in Congress, called the Cyber Intelligence Sharing
and Protection Act ("CISPA"), might dramatically increase this
percentage. CISPA would make it legal for the government to ask
companies for data about their customers and then protect those
companies from lawsuits related to the handing over of that data,
"notwithstanding any other provision of law."' 86
Second, the government can demand the data with a subpoena.
A subpoena need not be reviewed or pre-approved by a court to be
valid and enforceable.'" Google says that 68% of its data requests
from the government are in the form of a subpoena.'" Subpoenas
can request any information or documents that are at all relevant to
an investigation. Relevance is defined very broadly and includes
any information or documents that "might have the potential to
lead to relevant information."' 8 9 So long as a subpoena meets this
very lenient standard, a court will deem the subpoena valid to the
extent that the subpoena's demands are not overbroad or unduly
burdensome.190
Third, the government can demand the information with a court
order, which, by definition, does require prior approval by a
185 Salgado, supra note 174.
186 Declan McCullagh, How CISPA Would Affect You (FAQ), CNET (Apr. 27,
2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/how-cispa-would-affect-you-faq/.
117 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (West 2014) (providing the
attorney general with the authority to issue a subpoena without court approval).
'8 Salgado, supra note 174.
1 Responding to Subpoenas, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.
dmlp.org/legal-guide/responding-subpoenas (last visited June 1, 2014).
190 2nd Cir. Privilege Compendium: 4. Subpoena Not Overbroad or Unduly
Burdensome, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
http://www.rcfp.org/2nd-cir-privilege-compendium/4-subpoena-not-overbroad-or-
unduly-burdensome (last visited June 1, 2014).
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court."' Google says that 22% of its requests for data by the
government are from warrants, and another 6% are from court
orders.19 2 The NSA collects much of its data by using secret FISA
court orders, collecting huge sums of data from U.S. telephone
companies, including AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint, and Internet
service-providers like Facebook, Apple, Google, Microsoft,
Yahoo, and AOL.19 3 Statutes regulate these data-collection
efforts.19
Fourth, the government can purchase the information. Big Data
is valuable and companies are willing to sell.'9 5 For the right price,
9 Hence the name, "court order."
19 Salgado, supra note 174.
193 Everything You Need To Know About PRISM: A Cheat Sheet For the NSA's
Unprecedented Surveillance Programs, VERGE (July 17, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://
www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet.
194 Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act controls the government's ability
to gather information from telecommunications companies. See USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861) ("Section 215"). Section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act regulates the government's ability to gather Internet data from
Internet service-providers. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
113-103, § 702 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a) ("Section 702").
Under Section 215, the government may obtain an order "requiring the
production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents,
and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information
not concerning a United States person or to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities . . . ." Id. § 1861(a). When seeking
authorization to obtain such an order from the FISA court, the government must
also include "a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation." Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A). Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act
authorizes the government to, upon approval of the FISA Court, order an
electronic communication provider to "immediately provide the Government
with all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish the
acquisition [of data]. . . ." Id. § 1881a(h)(1)(A). Acquisitions can be made
without a court order if the government determines that exigent circumstances
require immediate gathering of information important to national security. Id.
§ 1881a(c)(2).
195 See Stephanie Faris, Selling Big Data as a Service: 5 Industries Big Data
Will Improve, DATAVERSITY (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.dataversity.net/selling-
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government can access the same rich data-troves held by private
organizations. For example, the federal government recently
started buying access to a private database maintained by the credit
bureau Equifax, called "The Work Numbers."1 6 The database
contains 54 million active salary and employment records and
more than 175 million historical records from approximately 2,500
U.S. employers. 9 7 Equifax also sells this same data to credit card
issuers, property managers, and auto lenders.' 98
Finally, the government can intercept the data using wiretaps,
bugs, and Trojan horses among many other available tools. The
NSA collects much of its data by tapping directly into
telecommunications cables, both domestically and abroad.'99 These
cables are owned by private-sector telecommunications companies,
not the U.S. Government. 200 According to top-secret records
provided by Edward Snowden, every day the NSA "Acquisitions
Directorate" collects millions of records from Yahoo and Google
this way.20 ' Apparently, "[fjrom undisclosed interception points,
the NSA . .. cop[ies] entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
that carry information among the data centers of the Silicon Valley
giants."202 In just one month, the NSA had collected nearly 200
million new records, which included metadata and the content of
text, audio, and video.203 In a classic case of the pot calling the
kettle black, a representative from Google blasted these activities,
big-data-as-a-service-5-industries-big-data-will-improve/ (discussing Big Data
services as lucrative government contracts).
196 Hicken, supra note 157.
1 Id.
198Id.
199 VERGE, supra note 193.
20 0 See Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, http://www. submarinecablemap.
com/#/submarine-cable/pacific-crossing-1-pc-I (last visited June 1, 2014) (showing
the many submarine cable lines and their private owners).
201 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links To Yahoo,
Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct.
30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-
links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/
e5 1d661e-4166-1 1e3-8b74-d89d7l4ca4ddstory.html.
202 Id.
203 Id.
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saying, "We are outraged at the lengths to which the government
seems to have gone to intercept data from our private fiber
networks . . . ."204 A spokesperson for Yahoo remained more
reserved, saying, "We have strict controls in place to protect the
security of our data centers, and we have not given access to our
data centers to the NSA or to any other government agency. "205
Google has since encrypted its dataflows between its data centers
in an effort to secure its customers' data from the NSA's prying
eyes.206
IV. THE LAW
Although private actors like Google are not limited by the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the government is.207 This
distinction, however, does not mean much in the context of Big
Data provided to the government by private parties. Under current
Supreme Court doctrine, the government can acquire huge
quantities of its citizens' data second-hand through private parties
without triggering any of the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. 208 There is only one significant limitation on this
power: the Fourth Amendment's protections do apply to the
content of communications. 209 But as Justice Sonia Sotomayor
points out, this limitation does little to protect privacy when one's
non-content data-metadata-already reveals so much.2 10
204 id
205 id
206 See Chris Welch, Google Encrypts Gmail Between Data Centers to Keep
the NSA Out of Your Inbox, VERGE (Mar. 20, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.
theverge.com/201 4 /3 /2 0/ 5 5 3 0 0 7 2 /google-encrypts-gmail-between-data-centers-
to-keep-out-nsa (discussing Google's encryption efforts).
207 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (discussing the
state action requirement).
208 See infra Part IV.B.
209 See infra Part IV.B.
210 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment controls the legality of government
searches and seizures. It reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2 11
When it applies, the Fourth Amendment protects. against
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 2 The guiding principle is
simple-searches and seizures must be reasonable. 213 But because
the Fourth Amendment does not define "unreasonable," the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine
has become complicated and often times, counter-intuitive.
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the government cannot
search something without consent unless it has some degree of
individualized suspicion that wrongdoing has occurred. 214 The
degree of individualized suspicion required to search a particular
suspect or his property increases as the suspect's expectation of
privacy rises.2 15 For example, a person having a loud conversation
in the middle of a mall has no expectation of privacy. No degree of
211 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
212 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
213 See id. at 18 ("The distinctions of classical 'stop-and-frisk' theory thus
serve to divert attention from the central inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment-the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.").
214 See id. at 30 (holding that a police officer must have more than a hunch but
less than probable cause to be able to stop and question an individual suspected
of wrongdoing). Furthermore, an officer conducting a so-called Terry Stop can
only pat down the individual if the officer reasonably believes the individual
possesses a weapon.
215 See, e.g., id. at 27 (permitting "frisks" when an officer stops a suspect on
reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a crime, but for the sole
purpose of ensuring officer safety); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31
(2001) (reiterating that entering the home generally requires a warrant); Bailey
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (discussing the "latitude"
provided by the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement in the context
of searches incident to arrests);.
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individualized suspicion is required before the government can
listen to this person's public conversation. But if the suspect is at
home, the suspect has a higher expectation of privacy. The degree
of individualized suspicion required before the government can
listen in on a conversation inside the home is, therefore, also
higher. The question is, again, one of reasonableness. Would a
person talking aloud in a mall "reasonably" expect privacy? No.
Would a person talking to a family member at home? Yes.
Unlike the mall, searches of the home are presumptively
unreasonable absent a warrant "particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized" signed by a
judge.216 The home is typically the most protected realm,2 17 often
called one's "castle."218 The only way for the government to search
someone's home without a signed search warrant is for
government to have probable cause that a suspect inside has
committed a crime, plus some exigent circumstance that creates an
immediate need for the government to enter the home (when there
is not enough time to get a warrant).2 9 Exigent circumstances
might include the imminent destruction of evidence (e.g. flushing
drugs down the toilet)220 or the immediate impending physical
harm to a person inside (e.g. domestic violence).22 1
The government is encouraged to take these requirements
seriously when they apply because failure to abide by them will
result in a court excluding evidence derived from the illegal search
and seizure. Courts refer to this court-created policy of excluding
216 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
217 Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the warrant requirement's
applicability to searches of the home).
218 See, e.g., id. at 511 n.4 (quoting William Pitt's description of the home as
one's castle).
219 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("In terms that apply equally
to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances,
that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.").
22o United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-38 (2003).
221 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
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evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.222 Evidence obtained illegally
is the fruit born by the poisonous tree and, except in certain
circumstances, courts will refuse to admit it at trial.223
Yet, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not apply if the Fourth Amendment
itself does not apply. As any first-year law student knows, the
Constitution does not apply to private actors, 224 with the exception
of a few Amendments that are not relevant to privacy.225 As a
result, private businesses can "search and seize" all they want
without violating the Constitution.22 6 To be sure, searching and
seizing a person's property without that person's consent can
constitute theft.227 It is not theft, however, when a private actor,
such as a business searches and seizes data that a customer gives to
it as part of the customer's relationship with that business.
The central question then is whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to governmental acquisitions of data obtained second-hand
through private parties. The answer depends on whether those
governmental acquisitions constitute "searches" or "seizures." If
the government conduct does not constitute a "search" or "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, then the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the government's conduct, even if
reasonable Americans would think of that conduct as a search or
seizure.22 8
222 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (creating, explaining, and
defending the Exclusionary Rule).
223 id
224 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
225 See Steve Vladeck, More Constitutional Curiosities: The Constitution and
Private Conduct, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 21, 2005), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2005/1 1/moreconstituti.html (discussing the private-public distinction).
226 See United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977).
221See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (West 2014) (defining theft).
228 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (noting that whether the
government's conduct constitutes a search is a question "antecedent" to applying
the Fourth Amendment).
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B. Searches and Seizures
The terms "search" and "seizure" are not defined in the Fourth
Amendment or anywhere else in the Constitution.229 Whether
something is a search or seizure is not an intuitive exercise
either.230 What an ordinary citizen might call a search or seizure
may or may not actually constitute a search or seizure under the
Supreme Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As a
result, whether government conduct constitutes a search or seizure
has been the subject of much litigation and has resulted in some
blockbuster Supreme Court cases, most prominently, Katz v.
United States23' and Jones v. United States.232
In Katz, the Court held that the government's covert recording
of the Defendant's phone-booth conversation constituted a search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.233 Though this holding is
important, Katz is better known for its reasoning. According to the
Court, the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places." 234 In
Katz, the government activity constituted a seizure because, in the
Court's view, the Defendant had a justifiable expectation that his
conversation would be private inside the phone booth, even though
passersby could easily see inside. 235 Most importantly, the Court
stated, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection," but "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."236
229 To some, this indicates that these terms are meant to travel on the river of
common law, changing as technology changes and society progresses. To
others, the terms must be defined and confined to the meanings they had at the
dawn of the Republic.
230 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (saying this question is not "simple").
231 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
232 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
233 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
234 Id. at 351.
2351 Id. at 353.
236 Id. at 351.
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These words have come to be understood as creating a
constitutionally protected "reasonable expectation of privacy,"23 7
despite the fact that the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy"
cannot be found anywhere in the majority opinion.2 38 The
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard actually comes from
Justice John Marshall Harlan's concurrence, where he stated that
his understanding of the Fourth Amendment was that "a person has
a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."23 9
He further clarified that he understood "reasonable" to create a
two-fold requirement: "first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one, that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
2 40
Later Courts expressly adopted this subjective-objective, two-fold
requirement.2 4'
Most recently, Jones held that the clandestine attachment of a
GPS tracking device to a defendant's vehicle constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment.24 2 But the conclusion is not nearly as
interesting as how the Court reached its conclusion. Although
Jones was a 9-0 judgment, it can be read as having two different
majority opinions based on two different legal theories.243 One
theory, advocated in Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion, is
237 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (referencing the "Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test").
238 Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-59 (discussing privacy but never saying the words
"reasonable expectation of privacy").
239 Id. at 360 (saying, for the first time in the written decision, the words
"reasonable expectation of privacy").
240 Id. at 361.
241 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding that a
defendant's expectation of privacy was "unreasonable" and was "not an
expectation that society is prepared to honor"). See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950
("Our later cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in
that case, which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a
person's 'reasonable expectation of privacy."').
242 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
243 See Tom Goldstein, Reactions to Jones v. United States: The Government
Fared Much Better than Everyone Realizes, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2012, 4:07
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=137698 ("I think that the correct way to
understand the case is to read it as having two separate majority opinions.").
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that the placement of the GPS tracker constituted a search because
it involved a physical trespass onto the Defendant's property.2 44
The other theory, advanced by Justice Alito's concurring opinion,
argued that the GPS tracking was a search because it violated the
Defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.245 But that five
justices, including Justice Sotomayor, went further and applied
Katz (or at least the Harlan concurrence) indicates that Justice
Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy standard is alive and
well on the Court.246
Particularly relevant to government acquisitions of Big Data is
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence. There, she expresses deep
concern about the ability of long-term GPS monitoring to generate
a "precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations. "247 In Justice
Sotomayor's view, the efficient, low-cost nature of GPS data
collection circumvents the ordinary constraints that, in practice,
restrict the ability of law enforcement to monitor a person's
whereabouts 24/7 over a long period of time.248 Such constraints
include limited resources and the generation of public antipathy
toward such comprehensive monitoring practices.249 Justice
Sotomayor states that she would take into account the attributes of
GPS technology when considering whether there is a reasonable
244 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (reasoning that the conduct constituted a
search because law enforcement trespassed when it attached the GPS device to
the Defendant's car).
245 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion because I agree that a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, '[w]here, as here, the
Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally
protected area."').
246 See id. at 954-55 (supporting use of Justice Harlan's reasonable
expectation of privacy test to resolve case); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring)
(same).2 47 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
248 See id. at 956 ("And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices .....
249 Id.
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expectation of privacy "in the sum of one's public movements."2 50
Specifically, she states that she "would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual
habits, and so on."2 5' She adds that the Fourth Amendment's goal
is "to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent 'a too
permeating police surveillance."'
25 2
C. The Third-Party Doctrine
The Harlan "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has given
rise to a few additional doctrines defining when government
activities would or would not violate a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy and, therefore, constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment. One such doctrine is the so-called
"Third-Party Doctrine," which the Supreme Court formally
adopted in United States v. Miller.25 3 There, the Court held that a
law enforcement request to a bank for information about a bank
customer's records did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 254 The Court held that a bank customer that
knowingly reveals his affairs to another also knowingly takes the
risk that the other will convey that information to the
Government.255 The Court then defined, for the first time, the
Third-Party Doctrine:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.2 56
In other words, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
information a person knowingly gives to another because
250 Id.
251 id
252 Id.
253 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
254 Id. at 439-40.
2 55 Id. at 443.
256 Id.
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providing information to another destroys any reasonable
expectation of privacy. 257 Put simply, the Fourth Amendment only
protects those secrets that you keep to yourself.
Ever since Miller, the Third-Party Doctrine has been a
cornerstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence upon which the
Supreme Court has relied on multiple occasions to permit law
enforcement to gather information without triggering the
protections and limitations of the Fourth Amendment. Garbage
bags placed on the street, even if opaque, are searchable without a
warrant due to the Third-Party Doctrine.258 Informants can wear a
wire without triggering Fourth Amendment protections because of
the Third-Party Doctrine.25 9 Police officers can even fly helicopters
400 feet above someone's house, hover in one spot to achieve the
perfect angle for viewing into the house, and then peer inside to
record information, all without so much as reasonable suspicion,
thanks to the Third-Party Doctrine.260
There is one important limitation on this "share information at
your own risk"261 Third-Party Doctrine. In Smith v. Maryland, the
Court held that the warrantless recording of the telephone numbers
that a man dialed from his home phone was not a search under the
Third-Party Doctrine.262 According to the Smith Court, a person has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers she
dials, even to a machine.26 3 But at the same time, the Court also
held that the individual does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the content of the phone conversation itself.264 The Court
has upheld this distinction in other contexts as well. For example,
257 Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
563 (2009).
258 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988).
259Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
260 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
261 Kerr, supra note 257.
262 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979).
263 See id. at 745 ("We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional
result is required because the telephone company has decided to automate.").
264 See id. at 741 (distinguishing between the contents of a telephone
conversation, which is protected, and the non-content numbers the Defendant
dialed, which it holds is not protected).
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while a postal mailing's destination, sender, recipient, and any
other contextual information readily viewable by the postal worker
are not protected,265 the content of the postal mailing is protected.2 66
This content, non-content distinction therefore acts as a limitation
on the ability of the Third-Party Doctrine to circumvent Fourth
Amendment protections.
V. A BETTER APPROACH
The Third-Party Doctrine, though an invaluable tool in the
twentieth century, must give way to a doctrine better tailored to the
realities of American life in the twenty-first century. The Court
should adopt the Klayman v. Obama267 approach and hold that
government acquisitions of data intrusive enough to cross the
Jones26 8 threshold are subject to protections of the Fourth
Amendment.
A. Time for a Change
The world is not as it was in 1789 when the Bill of Rights was
first written; or forty-six years ago when Katz was decided; or even
thirty years ago, when the Court applied the Third-Party Doctrine
to data collected by machines. In the Internet age, people's daily
activities, some mundane, some incredibly private, occur online
and almost exclusively through private third parties-mostly
machines. The phone booths in Katz are largely a relic of the past,
a vestige of the analog age long-since deceased. Americans now
talk through cell phones and online chat services like Skype.
Americans text and write emails instead of letters. Smartphones
and their suite of apps, phone, GPS location, Internet, texting, and
cloud storage have moved much of the core of human interaction
online. Even human sexuality, in e-books, chat rooms, text
265 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit opinions to establish the Fourth Amendment
differences between the content of a communication and its contextual
information).
266 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
267 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
268 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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messages, emails, and websites, has made its way online, in part
because people believe that their online activities are private. Soon,
nearly every device a person owns, from clothes and contact lenses
to refrigerators, cars, and thermostats, will electronically monitor
that person's daily life, inside the home and out, and even inside
the body and out.269
And while the government could not directly gather this data
without triggering Fourth Amendment protections,2 70 under the
Third-Party Doctrine the government can legally acquire the exact
same data by merely asking private parties for it, or in some cases,
intercepting it. Limitations on the Third-Party Doctrine, like the
already flimsy content/non-content distinction offered by Smith,
make very little difference in an age when one's metadata alone
can be as revealing as the contents of a person's communications.
Armed with mountains of highly-intrusive data obtained without
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the ability of government to perform
sweeping, suspicionless searches on millions of Americans has
never been easier, cheaper, more effective, and more worrisome.
At least one Justice would agree with this assessment. In Jones,
Justice Sotomayor declared that in the information age, "it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in [the metadata] information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties."27 ' Justice Sotomayor
explained that:
This [Third-Party Doctrine] approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People
disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books,
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. 272
She concluded that this issue need not be resolved at the time
of the holding because a narrower ruling was sufficient to resolve
269 See supra Part II.B.L.
270 See supra Part IV.A.
271 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
272 Id.
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the case. 273 But, like Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, she laid
the groundwork for future doctrine.
Whether four more Justices would agree with Justice
Sotomayor's proposal is unknown. Justice Alito's concurrence at
least suggests that he and at least three other Justices are amenable
to limiting the application of the Third-Party Doctrine when it
comes to highly-intrusive, comprehensive data-collection
techniques like the one in Jones.274 After all, if the long-term
collection of GPS data-data about a person's public
whereabouts-triggers the Fourth Amendment protections despite
the seeming applicability of the Third-Party Doctrine, then so too
should government acquisitions of rich troves of Big Data. After
all, Big Data likely contains comprehensive public and private
GPS data in addition to copious amounts of personal data.
More fundamentally, the Third-Party Doctrine is premised on
the flawed assumption that knowing exposure to others necessarily
defeats any reasonable expectation of privacy. Although a court
may declare that someone's public whereabouts, in-store behavior
and purchases, smartphone activity, and website browsing activity
are "knowingly exposed to others," it is not necessarily true that
the individual did so without a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Sharing information with one person does not equate to sharing
information with the world. This is especially true when the "person"
receiving the data is a hard drive belonging to a large corporation
like Time Warner Cable, Google, or Microsoft--companies that
boast about their robust "privacy" policies and promise to protect
people's data.275
Sometimes, a person's data shared with another cannot be
reasonably defined as having been "knowingly exposed." British
2 73 id.
274 See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (holding that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in highly intrusive data, like comprehensive GPS
records).
275 See, e.g., Your privacy is our priority, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.
com/security/online-privacy/overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2014) (stating
that "your privacy" is Microsoft's "priority" and expressing its "longstanding
commitment" to privacy).
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"tech-blogger" Doctorbeet did not know that he was sharing his
television-watching activity with a third party.276 The woman who
sends her boyfriend a text from an abortion clinic does not
"knowingly expose" her location to the rest of the world.277 Neither
does the user who searches "Oklahoma abortion law" or "Hillary
Clinton naked gay overbite porn."278 Nor do most people who send
volumes of hidden metadata along with the content of their
communications expect that data to be made available to the
public.
Sometimes people "knowingly expose their data" involuntarily.
Doctorbeet never intended, before or after he discovered that his
TV was snooping on him, to share his television-watching activity
with others. In fact, he continued to "knowingly expose" his data
after commanding his television to stop snooping. Arguably, the
private collection of people's data is almost always involuntary.
No one, or at least very few, would volunteer their data to others. If
people had a choice to turn off data collection, odds are that they
likely would.27 9 This is especially true when the data reveals
intimate and secret details of a person's life. Indeed, a recent poll
showed that 86% of Internet users have "taken steps online to
remove or mask their digital footprints." 280
Furthermore, the argument that people would freely give up
their privacy in exchange for quality online services is belied by
facts and life experience. Very few companies provide services
free of tracking, even when consumers pay for those services.28 '
For the vast majority of services, consumers have no other choice
but to hold their nose, click "I accept," and subject themselves to
276 See supra Part II.B.3.
277 See supra Part II.E.
278 See supra Part II.E.
279 See Rainie et al., supra note 141 (reporting the results of a poll indicating
the pro-privacy attitudes of the majority of Internet users).
280 See id
281 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com/privacy (last
visited Oct. 6, 2014) (permitting advertisers to collect cookie and beacon-based
data from Pandora listeners, regardless of whether the listener is a paying
customer).
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even more data collection. Saying that Americans have a "choice,"
when the only viable alternative is to opt out of all twenty-first
century technology, is to say that American's have a Hobson's
choice, or really, no real choice at all. Americans should not have
to shed the protections of the Fourth Amendment to enjoy the
benefits of the information age.
All of these situations undermine the rote application of the
Third-Party Doctrine to people's data. Proving that information
was knowingly exposed to a third party, although important to the
government's argument, is, by itself, insufficient to establish that
the data that the government seeks to acquire is unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment. Indeed, all of the data in Jones was
"knowingly exposed to others." In fact, that data was not only
knowingly exposed to others, it was knowingly exposed directly to
the public when the Defendant drove around on public streets. This
is an important distinction between the GPS data in Jones and the
kind of Big Data at issue here. Yet, even in Jones, the individual
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of his
movements despite exposing each of those movements directly to
the public. Certainly, if it can be reasonable to expect privacy in
information that a person knowingly exposes directly to the public,
then it can be reasonable to expect privacy in information that a
person knowingly exposes to a private third party. And if it can be
reasonable to expect privacy in public movements, then there is no
doubt that someone can expect privacy in information that he or
she unwittingly or involuntarily exposes to the public.
B. The Klayman v. Obama Approach
In Klayman v. Obama,282 a federal district court granted a
preliminary injunction against the NSA's bulk collection and
analysis of telephone call metadata after concluding that Smith-the
case giving rise to the Third-Party Doctrine-was so old and
unlike the facts before the court that it was simply inapposite.28 3
282 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
283 Id. at 43.
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The court concluded that, "In sum, the Smith pen register 284 and the
ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata Program have so many
significant distinctions between them that I cannot possibly
navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using as my
North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones." 285
Moreover, the Klayman court did not just limit the application
of the Third-Party Doctrine. It also supplied an alternative: the
Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.286 Though the court
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the NSA's warrantless
surveillance program, it did grant a temporary injunction against
the program on the theory that the program was substantially likely
to violate people's reasonable expectation of privacy. 287 By
employing this reasoning, the court fully embraced the
Alito-concurrence opinion in Jones: Highly intrusive data
collection by government can violate the Fourth Amendment even
if each individual data point in that data set was knowingly
exposed to others.288
By concluding that Smith is too inapposite to bind its judgment,
applying the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test instead,
and explicitly embracing Alito's concurrence in Jones, the
Klayman court shows the Supreme Court how Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence can be adapted to the twenty-first century in a way
that does not damage precedent or the Fourth Amendment itself.
C. Courts Should Adopt the Klayman Approach
This Article suggests courts adopt the Klayman approach.28 9
Courts should decline to mechanically apply the Third-Party
Doctrine to data the government obtains from third parties, and
instead hold that Americans have a reasonable expectation of
284 A pen register is a device employed by a telephone company that records
the numbers dialed on a telephone. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736
n.1 (1979) (describing a pen register).
2 85 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
286 Id. at 32-37.
287 Id. at 37.
288 See id at 30-36 (abiding by the Jones approach and frequently citing Jones).
289 See generally id.
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privacy in the collection of any amount of data, including
non-content metadata, that is as comprehensive and intrusive as the
GPS data collected in Jones. This would mean that any data
collection that is intrusive enough to cross the Jones threshold
would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment and
subject that data-collection to the reasonableness requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether the Third-Party
Doctrine applies. This would most certainly include, and therefore
protect against, government acquisitions of Big Data.
This fix would not undermine law enforcement because it
would still permit the government to obtain incriminating data on
persons suspected of wrongdoing. It would leave intact the
Third-Party Doctrine while at the same time dramatically limiting
its application. In other words, the Third-Party Doctrine would still
apply, but only up to a point. Within the narrow window between
zero data and the Jones intrusiveness threshold, the Klayman and
Jones approach would enable government to collect data without
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Above the Jones threshold, where the
data is so revealing and so intrusive as to create a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data, collecting the data would
constitute a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment and be
subject to Fourth Amendment protections, even if it would not
have been under the Third-Party Doctrine as defined in United
States v. Miller.290 And yet, even when the acquisition of the data
would cross the Jones threshold and constitute a search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, the Government could still get that
essential data if it could first articulate at least some degree of
suspicion that the individual committed or is committing some
crime.29 ' This is standard procedure for law enforcement in any
other context, and it has been for a very long time.292 Applying
Jones to Big Data simply extends the venerable protections of the
Fourth Amendment to our information age.
290 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
29) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (upholding "reasonable suspicion" as
the suspicion level required to stop a suspect).
292 See, e.g., id. (upholding reasonable suspicion standard in 1976).
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When the Exclusionary Rule, colorfully called the "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine," became law, the government was forced
to self-regulate. Similarly, a holding that Jones applies to Big Data
collection as well as to GPS data-collection would force the
government to self-regulate. The more data the government
collects, the harder the government will apply the brakes to its own
data collection to ensure that it does not cross the Jones threshold.
This is because the line between acceptable data-collection and the
kind of highly-intrusive data-collection at issue in Jones is not
entirely clear, at least not yet. As long as the government is
interested in prosecuting the target of its investigation and
data-collection efforts, government will self-regulate out of a fear
that it might go too far, cross the Jones threshold, and trigger
Fourth Amendment protections.293 The cost to law enforcement of
unintentionally going too far without abiding by the limitations of
the Fourth Amendment is high; the prosecution cannot, barring a
few exceptions, introduce such evidence at trial.294
Just how much data collection it would take to cross the Jones
threshold is, therefore, the big question. Databases of Big Data can
293 The Mapp Exclusionary Rule is very powerful. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (creating the Exclusionary Rule). So long as law
enforcement's goal is to prosecute and convict a suspect, then law enforcement
will take care to ensure that its searches and seizures are legal and any evidence
obtained pursuant to those searches and seizures will survive a motion to
suppress. See Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681
(1973-74) (documenting the success of the Exclusionary Rule in deterring
illegal police conduct). But see Thomas Y. Davies, Critique, On the Limitations
of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 NW. U. L. REV. 740 (1974)
(arguing that it was impossible to determine whether the Exclusionary Rule had
a deterrent effect); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (stating that
the Court's debate on the Exclusionary Rule "has been unaided, unhappily, by
any convincing empirical evidence on the effects of the rule").
294 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984). This assumes, as does the
rationale behind the Exclusionary Rule itself, that law enforcement cares about
prosecutions. True, if law enforcement does not care about the prosecutions and
cares about something else, like intimidation, then this rule would have no
effect.
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paint a highly-detailed portrait of a person. It takes very little data
to reveal a great deal of sensitive, private, and even intimate
information about an individual. Even more than GPS data, Big
Data can reveal a great deal about a person's sexual preferences,
health issues, legal questions, religious beliefs, etc.295 Conceivably,
even a very limited, granular dataset of pure metadata could cross
the Jones threshold (think of the example of the woman buying
batteries at a sex shop or the woman sending a text message from
an abortion clinic). This at least means that the government would
not be able to freely amass huge databases of Big Data on
thousands or millions of people without triggering the protections
of the Fourth Amendment. The Klayman court has already held
that the NSA's bulk collection of five-year's-worth of telephony
metadata from hundreds of millions of people without a warrant
likely violates Katz and Jones.296
Applying the Fourth Amendment to government acquisitions
of Big Data would prevent government from acquiring massive
databases on thousands of people for another reason: The Fourth
Amendment requires individualized, not generalized, suspicion.297
The appropriate level of suspicion that Person A committed a
crime would grant law enforcement the right to gather data about
Person A, not Person B, or anyone else for that matter.
Government would have to suspect that each and every person in
the dataset that it seeks to acquire committed a crime, or else it
would give up the right to use any incriminating data it did find on
an unsuspected person in that database. That a database "happens"
to contain other information on other people is no excuse either. In
a modern database, only basic database manipulation skills are
required to separate one individual's data from others. Surely, the
government entities or private parties that maintain databases
295 See supra Part 1I.D.
296 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-32 (D.D.C. 2013). But see
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (upholding as
constitutional the same NSA program).
297 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that a police officer must
have more than a hunch but less than probable cause to be able to stop and
question an individual suspected of wrongdoing).
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would have the minimal level of technical expertise necessary to
exclude unsuspected persons and their data from government
inquiries into suspected persons.
Such a holding would comport with precedent, abide by the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, and constrain
the Court to its more limited role as interpreters of the law rather
than creators of it. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones all
but pre-writes this future opinion. Justice Sotomayor need only
change "GPS data" to "Big Data," because the reasoning of the
two opinions would be identical. She concurred in Jones because
GPS monitoring generates a "precise, comprehensive record of a
person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations."29 8 At the very least, the exact same can be said of
government acquisitions of Big Data. More realistically, Big Data
is even more revealing and potentially more damaging than mere
GPS data of a person's public whereabouts. As shown by the
AOL's disastrous release of its customers' "anonymized" search
data, even a small quantity of data-even metadata-can reveal a
great deal about a person, especially because a great many, if not
most, people believe that their Internet activities are private or
anonymous.299 The prevalence of Internet pornography, and even
arguably the success of erotic e-books like Fify Shades of Grey,"
demonstrate that many, if not most, people believe, even if
erroneously, that their electronic activities are private, or at least
anonymous. This is only reinforced by the two-way mirror that
prevents people from seeing the myriad faceless entities that are
watching people's every move. Surely, if the totality of a person's
public whereabouts creates a reasonable expectation of privacy,
then so too does a data trove containing the most intimate details of
a person's life.
Perhaps most importantly, subjecting government acquisitions
of Big Data to Fourth Amendment scrutiny does not undermine the
298 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
299 See Rainie et al., supra note 141.
300 E. L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY (Vintage 2012).
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government's ability to protect its citizens from terrorist attack or
prevent the government from using Big Data to improve
government services. As effective as the Exclusionary Rule may be
at encouraging the government to comply with the Fourth
Amendment in most situations, the Exclusionary Rule has no effect
when the purpose of the government's search or seizure is
something other than prosecution.3 0 ' Prosecution is not the
government's goal when it comes to thwarting an imminent
terrorist attack. Nor is it the government's goal when it comes to
improving government services. In these situations, the
government can continue to gather all the Big Data it desires
without worrying about the consequences of violating a citizen's
Fourth Amendment rights. This may seem like a gaping loophole
in the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but in these limited
situations, such a loophole serves as a venting mechanism to
ensure that protecting American citizens' Fourth Amendment
rights does not interfere with the government's ability to keep its
citizens safe or improve government services: security, liberty,
privacy, and governmental efficacy, all at the same time.
To be sure, this Article's recommendation is not perfect. Just
like Jones, it would create serious line-drawing problems-the
kind of "thorny" issues that the Scalia majority wanted to avoid in
Jones.302 It is unclear precisely when the government's data
collection becomes too intrusive, crosses the Jones threshold, and
becomes subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. At
some point, the Court will also need to determine the appropriate
level of suspicion necessary to obtain intrusive data without a
warrant and when, if ever, the government must first obtain a
warrant.
These important questions must be answered at some point.
But just like Jones, the courts need not answer all of these
questions immediately.30 3 As with any judicially created doctrine,
courts have the ability to develop the jurisprudence over time and
301 See supra note 294.
302 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (majority opinion).
303 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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iron out the wrinkles as they arise. For now, courts can take the
first step of requiring government to abide by the rigors and
protections of the Fourth Amendment whenever government seeks
to acquire Big Data, either on its own or from private parties.
Otherwise, the status quo-a not-so-subtle circumvention around
the Fourth Amendment that effectively outsources government
surveillance to private parties-will continue to threaten the
freedom and liberty of Americans, chill speech, and shift the
expectations of Americans further toward Orwell's 1984.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an age when people's lives are constantly tracked, recorded,
analyzed, and shared by private parties, the doctrine holding that
"information knowingly exposed to private parties is unprotected
by the Fourth Amendment," now threatens to swallow whole the
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. This Article
suggests courts adopt the Klayman v. Obama approach and hold
that the Fourth Amendment's protections apply to government
acquisitions of Big Data. More specifically, courts should follow
Justice Alito's reasoning in United States v. Jones to hold that
government acquisitions of Big Data are searches subject to the
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Surely, if
the government's collection of simple GPS data in Jones was
intrusive enough to constitute a search, then so are government
acquisitions of Big Data. Though such a holding would leave
unresolved many important questions, such as whether the
collection of bulk data would require a warrant, it would be an
important first step that would bring the Fourth Amendment into
the twenty-first century and enable the next generation of
Americans to conduct their lives without fear of unreasonable
government searches and seizures of their most private data.
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